Extended Mentality: What It Is and Why It Matters
University of Miami, Department of Philosophy
OVERVIEW: Does it matter if (some) mental processes extend into the subjects's environment. The notion of mattering is an elliptical one: something matters only to someone and in some way. A tacit assumption in the recent debate is that the question of whether mental processes extend should be decided by way of its implications for cognitive science. The persons to whom it matters and who should be charged with adjudicating the issue are, accordingly, cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science. I shall argue against this assumption. What is really at stake is a philosophical vision of the nature of mentality that can, to a considerable extent, be elaborated independently of developments in cognitive science.
READINGS:Rowlands, M. (2009). Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi, 28(1), 53-62.
Rowlands, M. (2009). Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology, 22(1), 1-19.
Rowlands, M. (2010). The new science of the mind. Mit Press.
Professor Rowlands will also be giving a special talk Wednesday evening July 16 on animal rights:
Rowlands, M. (2013). Animal rights. Blackwell